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Approved For Release 2000/05/05 : CIA-RDP73-00027R000100040001-6

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DIARY NOTES

DD/S

31 March 1970

\* \* \* \* \*

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\* Garage [REDACTED] At the Executive Committee today I informed the meeting of the selection of the [REDACTED] Garage and the cost and other reasons therefor. The Director asked if we were considering arrangements whereby the assigned chauffeurs might park their cars at Agency headquarters property thereby avoiding the time spent and difficulties of negotiating the traffic flow during the morning hours from the garage to headquarters and the evening hours from headquarters back to the garage. I advised that this matter was under consideration.

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25X1A In connection with the planning for the use of the [REDACTED] I asked that consideration and planning be given to this aspect as expressed by the Director. Sometime before occupancy of the garage I would like the Office of Logistics to submit a tentative plan as to how this might be worked out. This may pose some servicing problems on the cars in use but certainly this could be worked out. On the other hand, there might be a fair savings in the overtime earned by chauffeurs as they would not have to spend quite so much time "in transit" if they had to pick up and deliver their cars at the new garage.

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\*Extract to D/Logistics

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DIARY NOTESDD/S30 March 1970

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\*1. Replacement of [REDACTED] Today, with Mr. Blake,

[REDACTED] I visited the prospective sites at the D. C.

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Transit Building on Grace Street, Georgetown, and the [REDACTED] Building located on [REDACTED]. Prior to the visit a briefing was given concerning all pertinent statistics and costs relating to the several properties. Upon completion of the inspection it was my decision that the Agency should acquire the [REDACTED] site in light of its cost per foot at \$1.65, annual rental at \$36,000, renovation cost at about \$150,000 and its inside square footage of 21,000 plus additional 13,840 square feet of outside useable property. Following the inspection I so informed the ExDir of my decision and in turn informed the Director of Logistics to proceed with GSA in the acquisition of this property. In the discussion with GSA for the rental of the property, presumably on a five-year lease, we should seek to incorporate a forfeiture clause in the event we do not need this facility for the full five years, and a sublease clause for commercial use also on the premise of not needing the property for the full five years. The commercial sublease clause may be a problem with GSA.

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\*\*2. Repairs to the Director's Chrysler: Today I inspected the

Director's Chrysler to assure that the suggested repairs set forth in the 20 March 1970 memorandum from Chief, Logistics Services Division were warranted and necessary. My findings were as follows:

- a. The new engine is necessary, cost \$940.
- b. The rear bumper is damaged and should be replaced, cost \$167.
- c. The windshield is cracked having been struck by some object. The crack apparently is spreading and the windshield needs to be replaced, cost \$127.

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and  
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d. The metal wheel covers are badly pitted and scarred and all should be replaced, cost \$80.

e. The upholstery in the front and rear seats is rather badly soiled through use. It does not appear that these could be cleaned successfully after their long use and they need to be replaced, cost \$75.

f. Painting of the car. In a number of places the paint is chipped and a number of places on the side doors and on the front hood the metal surfaces which represent ridges in the body frame or edges are worn down to the metal. Some of this has resulted from chipping but mostly from abrasion and rubbing where the paint has been completely removed. Accordingly a repaint job is necessary, cost \$200.

g. Minor miscellaneous repairs, cost \$50.

Total \$1,639.

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[REDACTED] is to ascertain if a new engine is available for installation and arrangements should be made through Elizabeth with the Director for the availability of the Chrysler for 10 days to effect these repairs. During the 10 days the Director can use the Cadillac which is in good operating shape or if this is not to his liking, one of the new Fords or Chevys.

25X1A      \*\*\*3. Newsweek Article on Air America: On 27 March 1970 I mentioned at the Executive Committee Meeting that Everett Clark of Newsweek had contacted [REDACTED] concerning Air America and in the course of this meeting we learned that Harvey Wexler of Continental Airlines had twice stated to Newsweek that Air America was owned by the U. S. Government and run by CIA and that he had been officially informed of this fact.

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Sat. - Sun.

**28-29**

March

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MEMORANDA

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DIARY NOTES

DD/S

25 March 1970

1. Headquarters Cafeteria Survey: I met with the Executive Director to discuss my upcoming luncheon with Mr. John Dillon, newly appointed President of GSI. I outlined my approach to Mr. Dillon vis-a-vis the Agency's desire to have several outside cafeteria vendors review the Agency operation and seek proposals for the operation of the cafeteria. This survey will be conducted before we adopt the two principal recommendations of the GSA-Marcus N. Wright recent survey, namely to install self-bussing and totalizing of servings rather than a normal cashier payment type operation.

The Executive Director advised that he wanted Agency representatives to directly participate with the GSA in the selection of the outside vendors and advising the vendors as to certain basic requirements in any proposal for the operation of the Agency cafeteria. Additionally, Agency representatives would be present and facilitate outside vendor survey. It was felt that this is necessary to get a reasonable consideration of any outside proposal as GSA appears to be quite satisfied with the GSI operation and they would tend therefore not to pursue the outside vendor approach too vigorously. It could well be that the outside vendors will show little interest and that GSI operation may end up as the logical course of action, however, we must make the effort and satisfy ourselves as to whether there is a better way to operate our cafeteria in the best interests of all concerned.

2. Display of President's Picture: Today Mr. Blake handed to me a memorandum dated 17 March 1970 from Mr. Weaver, GSA Building Manager, concerning the lack of Agency response to the display

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of the President's picture in the main lobby of the Headquarters Building. It appears that this direction from GSA for such action has been rocking along since 31 December 1969 with an inadequate response from the Agency to the GSA. According to the memorandum the matter has reached Mr. Harold Pavel, Deputy Director PBS Region 3, who asked that the Agency provide a memorandum explaining why the picture would not be allowed in the lobby.

Obviously the Agency has been dilatory in responding and it appears to me the matter is getting a bit out of hand and could have some unfortunate and misunderstood repercussions. Accordingly I asked Mr. Blake to contact Mr. Pavel immediately and explain that we have the matter under consideration but we are having some difficulty from the aesthetic standpoint in properly locating the place to display the President's picture. Mr. Pavel was advised that appropriate action will be taken as soon as possible. Meantime I talked to [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] of the Fine Arts Commission and advised of this situation and the fact that we must take some immediate action and not let this drag on any longer. The manner in which the program has been presented leaves us little alternative except to display the President's picture in the lobby even though we might think there are more appropriate places to display this picture. I also called [REDACTED] Building Manager, and advised that we were taking action and that we would not write a letter to GSA but would leave it to [REDACTED] to handle it through his channels advising that appropriate action had been taken. I further alerted the Executive Director to this problem and the course of action that I was taking to assure that we do have appropriate response to this GSA requirement.

3. Repairs to the Director's Chrysler: I showed to the Executive Director the proposed repairs to the Director's Chrysler as set forth in the memorandum on 20 March 1970 from the Chief, Logistics Services Division. These repairs will take 10 days if all are approved. The Executive Director asked me to personally inspect the Director's car to assure myself that the list of seven repair items are necessary. I will do so within the next several days.

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


DIARY NOTES

DD/S

23 March 1970

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2. Soviet Movie - "True Sons of the People": At the conference at [REDACTED] the movie, "True Sons of the People" was shown and it was determined by the Director that he would like an English sound commentary to go with the film explaining some of the types of equipment featured in the film. [REDACTED] recommended [REDACTED] of his Directorate as being the most knowledgeable of the equipment and personalities in the film. Accordingly, I have arranged for [REDACTED]


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[REDACTED] OTR to collaborate in devising an English language sound commentary to the film. I asked that this be first worked out in script form and submitted to the DD/S, DD/S&T and the DD/I for approval. (Action on this was issued on 25 March.)

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DIARY NOTESDD/S23 March 1970

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1. Agency Garage: In reference to the proposed authorization to take over the [REDACTED] property on [REDACTED] as the Agency garage the consideration was raised by the Executive Director of the possibility of constructing a garage on Agency Headquarters property. As a result a meeting was held today with the Executive Director, Larry Houston, John Clarke and the DD/S to consider the legal and congressional proprieties of obtaining approval from the Bureau of the Budget and the congressional committee but without the necessity of having to get a congressional authorization and appropriation. After some discussion of the problem it was agreed that Mr. Houston would submit a paper to the Executive Director who in turn will take this matter up with the Director for policy approval. Meantime, I asked the Executive Director to approve the [REDACTED] memorandum so that we might proceed with the obtaining of this property and renovating it for garage purposes. Construction on the Agency property would take a minimum of two years and we must have a garage by 30 June 1970.

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2. Research and Development Funds: A meeting was set up with the DD/P for 23 March to discuss projects of mutual interests to the DD/P and the DD/S. Unfortunately the DD/P had to cancel for other priorities but it was agreed that we would meet prior to the Deputies' Meeting on the allocation of R&D projects.

3. Finance Officers Overseas: Les Bush this date asked whether or not I would agree for relatively senior Finance officers scheduling TDY trips overseas for the purpose of reviewing the activities of individual Finance officers assigned overseas. This would be a two-way street of briefing the Finance officers on Finance matters, career program activities, personnel policy aspects and reviewing any problems that the Finance officer may have. This is particularly for those Finance officers who are the only representatives at overseas stations. I thought this was a good idea and so approved this action.

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4. [REDACTED] Subject, who served as the Labor Advisor to the FEPA negotiating team, asked to meet with me to discuss a suggestion by [REDACTED] as to whether he would be interested in serving as the [REDACTED]  
I made arrangements to meet with [REDACTED] at Costin's Restaurant at 12:20 p. m. Wednesday, 25 March 1970.

\* 5. Request to the Bureau of the Budget for Additional SPS Positions: DD/S&T in support of its newly assigned programs is requesting some additional SPS positions. In accordance with the agreement reached with the Bureau of the Budget, increase in such positions is negotiable for new projects. In a discussion with the Executive Director the problem of who would negotiate with the Bureau of the Budget was raised and it was agreed that John Clarke and the Office of Personnel would pursue this with the Bureau of the Budget. I asked out of this proposition as I would simply have to brief myself to a considerable degree on a matter that is fully knowledgeable to both John Clarke and SPS.

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\*Extract to D/CO

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Sat. - Sun.

21-22

March

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MEMORANDA



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DIARY NOTES

DD/S

19 March 1970

1. Flight Surgeon: Dr. Tietjen advised today that he is deleting the Flight Surgeon from his Table of Organization. This type of service has not worked out too well and it is felt that the need for this program is not a continuing responsibility.

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25X1A 2. [REDACTED] Dr. Tietjen today advised that [REDACTED] plans to retire in December 1971. He wishes to discuss this with me and has made some vague reference to what he terms his "commitment". I do not know what this means but I will explore this with him.

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Luncheon for

Representative William E. Minshall (R., Ohio)

Wednesday - 18 March 1970

~~120000~~  
~~1230 hours~~  
~~1145~~

Director's Dining Room

Richard Helms

Director of Central Intelligence

Robert E. Cushman

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Lawrence K. White

Executive Director - Comptroller

R. Jack Smith

Deputy Director for Intelligence

T. H. Karamessines

Deputy Director for Plans

Carl Duckett

Deputy Director for Science and  
Technology

Robert Bannerman

Deputy Director for Support

John M. Maury

Legislative Counsel

Please make  
Minshall - a note in your records  
that I met the Congressman.

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MINSHALL, Representative William E. (R., Ohio)

Birthplace: East Cleveland, Ohio  
Residence: Lakewood, Ohio  
Marital Status: Married

Birthdate: 24 October 1911  
Children: 3 sons

Education:

Attended University of Virginia; Cleveland Law School, LL.B., 1940.

Public Career:

Congresses: 84th - 91st (1955-70).

Current Congressional Committees: Appropriations (CIA Subcommittee).

Other: Member, Ohio General Assembly, 1939-40; General Counsel,  
Maritime Commission, 1953-54.

Military Service:

Enlisted in December 1940 as private in U.S. Army and served in European theater, G-2 Section, Hdqtrs. III Corps and was honorably discharged as lt. colonel in March 1946.

Civic Activities and Organization Affiliations:

American, Ohio and Cleveland Bar Associations; Rotary.

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CIA Interests:

Member of Defense Subcommittee for several years, appointed to CIA Subcommittee in 1970.

Has expressed concern that the intelligence community does not provide advance warning of flare-ups as in the case of the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the 1967 coup in Athens.

Once commented that the Director wasn't too popular in some circles because he was the only one in Washington who told the truth and some people didn't like that.

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DIARY NOTES

DD/S

16 March 1970

1. Air America - Arnold Abrams Newspaper Inquiry: I briefed the Executive Committee on the message from [REDACTED] dated 13 March (IN 042797) concerning inquiry by Abrams about Air Asia-Air America operations. Abrams represents the Seattle Times and Far East Economic Review. The interview has been conducted and at best we can wait for the results of the interview.

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2. GSI - John Dillon: From briefing notes and a conversation with the Executive Director I am to invite John Dillon, the new President of GSI, over for lunch. At the same time I will brief him on our GSI contract arrangement at [REDACTED]. It appears there is some confusion with GSI over our attitude towards the continuing of the GSI contract and whether or not we are ready to go for self-bussing. I will have an opportunity at this time to explain all of this to Mr. Dillon. I will endeavor to set up this luncheon either this week or next week.

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3. [REDACTED] On Saturday Elizabeth indicated that she wanted 12 copies of the booklet "Presidents of the United States on Intelligence". I asked Miriam if she would arrange for that number of copies to be furnished [REDACTED] on Monday morning.

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4. Weekend Meeting at [REDACTED] For this coming weekend's meeting at [REDACTED] the Executive Director asked if the film "Why Man Creates" by Kaiser could be shown to the group on Friday evening, 20 March. I called [REDACTED] and asked him to make the necessary arrangements and let me know if there was any problem.

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5. [REDACTED] I advised the Executive Director that the subject is the son of [REDACTED]. He was arrested early Sunday morning and charged with assault with intent to commit murder and concealment of a weapon. It appears that [REDACTED] who has had a number of problems of recent date, was in a bar at 23rd and K Streets in Washington. He was fairly drunk and got in a fight at the bar. After leaving the bar an undercover police detective who was not in uniform approached him with a view to arresting him. [REDACTED] apparently thought the policeman was one of those with whom he had just had the fight at the bar and he pulled a concealed .25 caliber revolver and began shooting. He was disarmed, arrested and charged as above. Howard Osborn was alerted and has endeavored to keep it out of the press. Sunday [REDACTED] was so notified. So far there has been no publicity.

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6. [REDACTED] Acting Chief, Soviet Bloc Division, called to advise that [REDACTED] has been ill for some time and advised that he wants to recommend [REDACTED] for promotion and asked whether a memorandum from him was necessary. I advised that we will have in the near future another supergrade promotion exercise and that we fully understood that [REDACTED] and it was unnecessary that he write another memorandum to this effect. I will use this opportunity to write a memorandum for the record which will serve the same purpose.

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7. [REDACTED] The Director called me through Colonel White to advise that Saturday while over at the White House a [REDACTED] advised that her husband used to work for the Agency but is now an inmate of the Western State Hospital in Virginia. She stated that she has been unable to get anything out of the Agency and she can't pay the bills for the hospital care and doesn't think the Agency had done right by her. I had Mr. Wattles check the record and found that

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[REDACTED] left the Agency on disability retirement, presumably on psychiatric grounds. The handling of his case and all benefits would be by the Civil Service Commission. He had only Aetna Hospital Insurance for himself alone. It appears he physically mistreated his wife just prior to the retirement. He had been an employee since [REDACTED]

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and was a GS 12-8.

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I arranged to have Mr. Wattles call [REDACTED] at the White House and in turn have someone go over and meet with her to find out what the problem is and see what we can do to assist her in her contacts with the Civil Service Commission. I advised the Executive Director of this course of action.

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LAST MONTH							1970 MARCH 1970							NEXT MONTH						
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Sat. - Sun.

**14-15**

March

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MEMORANDA

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DIARY NOTES

DD/S

13 March 1970

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1. Congressman Passman - Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee - USAID Hearing: Les Bush advised that James E. William's office, Chief, Budget Division, USAID advised that they were to appear before Congressman Passman's committee on Wednesday. AID had been informed in advance that the committee would be interested in knowing how many man years and how much money CIA had reimbursed to USAID from Fiscal Year 1969 to projected Fiscal Year 1972 for [REDACTED]. Additionally, they wanted to know the Agency's share in dollars of USAID [REDACTED]

25X1C

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[REDACTED] Subsequently, it was determined that this is a regular appropriations hearing by AID and the committee was really interested in determining whether AID appropriations were being used to pay CIA costs. The answer of course is no as CIA reimburses AID in full. The dollar costs in question have been worked out between the Office of Finance and AID and there is no dispute on these figures. I discussed this with Jack Maury [REDACTED] and Mr. Maury was endeavoring to arrange how we will handle this request. It is believed that the best way would be for AID to advise the committee that CIA reimburses AID in full for all costs and that no AID appropriations are used on behalf of CIA. If the committee wishes details and amounts the AID officials should state that they must take the matter under advisement and confer with CIA. [REDACTED] will endeavor to work out this formula.

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25X1A

2 [REDACTED] Air Conditioners: I advised the Executive Committee that the Agency had acquired 200 surplus window-type air conditioners from the Navy which will be shipped to [REDACTED] and installed in the houses at [REDACTED]. As surplus they will be at no cost to the Agency except for delivery and repair costs. The Director advised that this was a good step.

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DOWNGRADING AND  
DECLASSIFICATION

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3. Personal Firearms: In my recent trip overseas there were several instances where employees had a personal firearms collection. They were mentioning some of the problems that were incurred in including these weapons in their household effects in returning to the States. I noted with some concern the elaborate series of steps of registration and declaration and identification of the ownership of the arms in arranging for their return to the U. S. In addition I understood that to have possession of the weapons in a foreign area the individuals apparently had to register these both [REDACTED]

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25X1C

[REDACTED]

In light of the great public concern expressed today over possession of personal firearms, registration of such weapons and the somewhat elaborate control about transporting weapons across state lines and international lines the personal weapons should be transported by our employees only when the employee knows in advance that the weapons can be readily taken with him and that the opportunity to use them for personal purposes is clearly evident at the post of assignment. I have not made a study of this problem but am looking at it in a very cursory fashion. I ask [REDACTED] to review our regulations and procedures in this regard and perhaps consider whether or not this poses a serious problem and whether or not there should be some DD/P guidance to all personnel about transporting personal weapons overseas.

4. WAEPA Board: John Noble of WAEPA called me at my home on Wednesday 11 March to advise that the WAEPA Board is meeting next week and they are anxious to have the official designation of the new Agency representative. It seems that [REDACTED] was our designated representative of this Board but his position has been vacant since July when [REDACTED] retired. Today I checked with both Mr. Wattles and the Executive Director and the latter designated [REDACTED] as our representative. Meantime the Executive Director called both Roger [REDACTED] who are members of that Board nominating [REDACTED] I in turn called John Noble to advise that [REDACTED] is our representative and asked whether any additional papers were necessary. Noble advised that he had all the necessary information and he would make the formal presentation to the Board.

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\* \* \* \* \*

5. Package Inspection: A bomb threat was made against the Agency in a telephone call to the Security office today. The caller stated that he had been asked to bring a bomb into the Agency to blow up the building. Howard Osborn took a number of precautionary measures in checking access to the Headquarters compound and the questioning and inspection of any suspicious persons trying to enter. Over the weekend, Saturday and Sunday, a tighter badge and package control was exercised. Any employee bringing a package into the Agency was asked to open it and inspect it in the presence of Security Officers to be sure there was no unauthorized material. This proceeded without problem except for [redacted] of DD/I who raised a considerable objection. The matter was eased after it was made plain that he was the one to do the inspecting in the presence of a Security Officer. Another DD/P employee objected but quickly relaxed as soon as he understood that he was the one to do the inspecting of his own package.

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6. [redacted] When I was in [redacted] was quite interested in his next assignment but I was not aware of that assignment. Upon returning to headquarters the decision was reached that he would be Chief of Support at [redacted] and a message was sent to [redacted] advising him of this assignment.

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RLB:llc

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downgrading and  
declassification

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LAST MONTH							MARCH							NEXT MONTH						
1970 FEBRUARY 1970							1970 MARCH 1970							1970 APRIL 1970						
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## Wednesday

11

March

A. M.

P.M.

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12:45	5:00

**MEMORANDA** *PLB - B-1*

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EYES ONLY

*[Handwritten Signature]*

MINUTES OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

25X1A

A-DD/S

11 March 1970

25X1A

1. [REDACTED] s back. He had a good, although very fast, trip.



25X1A

2. DD/I reported some unhappiness with the persistent challenge which he perceives in White House Staff questions on quality of research. The Director had not heard of this before and [REDACTED] indicated that the challenge seemed to be the depth of the research in contrast with that for example of the [REDACTED].

25X1A

3. Mr. Maury called attention to the award made to Senator Jackson of the VFW Congressional Award.

4. Yesterday's Hearing apparently went well, the Director giving credit to Mr. Duckett and Mr. Chamberlain. Mr. Maury cited as evidence of the satisfactory nature of the Hearing that Senator Murphy had asked for a picture of the Director.

25X1C

5. On the [REDACTED] matter, Mr. Helms noted a telephone call from Under Secretary Richardson in which he had agreed with the Under Secretary's idea of suggesting to Senator Fullbright that Mr. Helms appear before Mr. Fullbright's Committee in lieu of AID's Dr. Hannah. Further on the [REDACTED] the Director noted that he had telephoned the managing editor of the Washington Post and the Washington Bureau Chief of the Los Angeles Times and had some other actions planned.

25X1C

6. Colonel White noted favorably the special CBS half-hour program last night hosted by Charles Collingwood - DD/I said that they have a tape of the program.

EYES ONLY

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EYES ONLY**

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25X1A

7. The Director asked Mr. Houston the status of the transfer of [REDACTED] to the Smithsonian. Mr. Houston indicated that a letter to Dillon Ripley from the DCI is being prepared and that following consultation with protocol people the physical transfer will be arranged. The Director enjoined Mr. Houston to see this transaction through to its final conclusion.

25X1A

8. DD/P reported that the [REDACTED] have initiated a stand-down in liaison with military and civilian contacts.

9. Colonel White noted that a Mr. Sorrels (sp. ?), BOB, had requested the CIB's for the month of February proposing to analyse what raw intelligence went into the finished report. (Mr. Sorrels was identified to the Director as the individual who sat behind [REDACTED] at a NRO related session and had evidenced anti [REDACTED] and other anti-program ideas.) The DD/I opposed giving the book to the BOB noting that this people had recently completed detailed analysis on six months work. The Director decided that Mr. Sorrels should be invited to come to the Agency to meet with the DD/I representatives to sort out this matter.

25X1A  
25X1A

25X1A

10. DDCI reported on the Defense Posture Committee Meeting which he attended yesterday for Mr. Helms. Apparently the bulk of the time was devoted to the question of further public disclosure concerning [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In the final analysis it was decided that the CIA matters and [REDACTED] involvement would remain classified. Also from this meeting came word that SecDef is very bothered by the air costs in [REDACTED] and is determined to cut the sortie rate. He believes and apparently many other people do also that the criteria are availability of planes, pilots and ordnances and not operational requirements.

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

11. [REDACTED] responded to the Director's question concerning the Washington Post article on the Kissinger team having returned from Vietnam. [REDACTED] said that there was not a team per se, that a number of individuals who had been working on the Vietnamization question had gone to South Vietnam to complete studies on a number of specific provinces. Only two Agency officers were involved, both from OER,

[REDACTED]

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**EYES ONLY  
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**SECRET**  
**EYES ONLY**

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25X1A  
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25X1A

12. The Director asked Mr. Karamessines when he would be ready to react to the comment by Representative Bow to the effect that the Agency had too many people in [REDACTED]. Mr. Karamessines said that [REDACTED] DC/WH, is ready and the Director (not completely satisfied on [REDACTED]) said that Mr. Maury [REDACTED] should arrange to call on Mr. [REDACTED]

25X1A

13. The Director called attention to a memorandum signed by Mr. Richardson as Chairman of the NSC Under Secretary's Committee which calls on CIA and DOD to further reduce overseas Agency and attache personnel. The Richardson memorandum attaches a paper from Mr. Kissinger which identifies the reduction as the President's desire. The Director was very unhappy with this event and intends to counter it very strongly. His proposed initial action will be a session with the PFIAB and a letter (not clear whether to Mr. Kissinger or Mr. Richardson) challenging the basis on which the conclusion was founded. DDCI speculated as to whether Ambassador Annenberg's recent remark about stumbling over people in [REDACTED] could be the basis for the Kissinger paper.

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John [REDACTED] Coffey

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downgrading and  
declassification

## Sen. Jackson Praised by President

CPYRGHT

President Nixon last night praised Sen. Harry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) as a spokesman for national security and "a man who understands the threat to peace and freedom in the world as well as any man I know."

M. Nixon delivered the ac-

colade at a dinner of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, which presented Jackson with its Congressional Award. The Washington senator has been a leader of senate forces favoring the anti-ballistic missile

choice for Secretary of Defense. Jackson declined to be considered for the post. VFW Commander-in-Chief Ray Gallagher pledged his organization to back Mr. Nixon "100 per cent" in any effort to increase defense spending, including the ABM.

and was Mr. Nixon's first

CPYRGHT

## Kissinger Team Ends Vietnam Survey

By Robert G. Kaiser  
Washington Post Foreign Service

SAIGON, March 10 — Ten U.S. officials sent here by Dr. Henry Kissinger to assess the pacification program have completed their work and headed back to Washington.

The ten—five from the State Department, three from the CIA and two from the Defense Department — came to Vietnam to investigate optimistic reports from the field with a deliberately skeptical eye.

According to informed sources here, Kissinger and other top officials in Wash-

ton hoped this kind of special investigation would help them evaluate the steady stream of optimism that has dominated official reports from Vietnam for months.

"They're inundated with facts in Washington," one official source said. "They don't know what to make of them."

The 10 men who came to Vietnam for visits of about three weeks all had previous experience here. All spent most of their time in the countryside, each investigating the situation in one or two prov-

inces they had worked in on earlier tours in Vietnam.

Sources who talked to the visitors said many of them found grounds for skepticism about the official optimism here. Several, for example, said the South Vietnamese government seemed to have little to do with pacification's success in the last year, these sources reported.

Some pacification officials in Vietnam have also expressed the view that the dramatic increase of government control in the countryside has been achieved in spite of a medio-

cre performance by the government. Like several of Kissinger's investigators, these officials attribute many of the gains to U. S. firepower and temporary Communist weakness.

Informed sources also said some of the Kissinger investigators were impressed by the degree of government control in the country, even if they questioned the reasons for it.

Most of the 10 investigators shared their observations with Gen. Creighton W. Abrams and other top officials here before returning to Washington. Abrams was said to have spent as much as two hours with some of them.

THE WASHINGTON POST

11 March 1970

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DIARY NOTES

A-DD/S

11 March 1970

Deputies' Meeting: Mr. Karamessines was tied up with the Director so Colonel White stalled momentarily.

a. CT Paper: He announced that he had approved the rewrite of the CT paper on the assurance of Hugh Cunningham that the only problems had been raised by the CS and these had been resolved. When Mr. Karamessines came in Colonel White repeated his statement including the understanding that the CS was satisfied with the paper. It drew no adverse comments from Mr. Karamessines.

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b. Risk-of-Capture: I suggested as a filler item the status of the 8-hour risk-of-capture course which had been proposed by [redacted] as a preliminary to consideration of our paper by the Deputies' Meeting. I passed out, with Colonel White's blessing, copies of the attached outline paper.

c. Proper Attire: Colonel White also used the blank time to comment on the dress of some of the people he sees in the halls and the cafeteria. He suggested that perhaps these individuals, primarily men, are shift workers in the Signal Center, Cable Secretariat, or computer areas. He asked that staff meeting channels be utilized to request that at least when in the corridors individuals should dress with appropriate measure of dignity and good sense.

25X1A

d. [redacted] Colonel White passed out copies of the "final" draft of [redacted] as Mr. Karamessines joined the meeting. He asked that comments/concurrence be given to the Director of Personnel not later than close of business 18 March. He noted his understanding that the DD/S, IG and

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BY THE END OF 2030

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GC had agreed to the paper as distributed. He had Mr. Houston give a short background briefing for the manner in which the regulation was constructed. In the course of his discussion Mr. Houston mentioned the procedural document which DD/S and DD/P (D/Personnel added DD/S&T) have produced as being correctly structured and worked. In the subsequent discussion it was noted that it would probably be wise to reissue procedures following 1 July since those now approved in the Directorates are keyed specifically to the special situation and time table of the period from 1 March to 1 July 1970. Colonel White noted that he reviewed the 1 March reports from the Deputies and believed that the maximum of 125 surplus is indicated and that he would expect that the actual number would be considerably less. Mr. Duckett has received an affirmative ExDir response to his question as to whether Directorates could be over-strengthed temporarily through the hiring of needed new professionals at the same time that the surplus declarations had not been finally settled. Colonel White as a final point asked whether the protection of sources and methods emphasized in the first sentence of [redacted] is appropriate and was assured by Mr. Houston that he feels it is needed.

25X1A

e. Married Couples Paper: Colonel White asked for comments. I gave two mechanical suggestions (a) that the papers be addressed to the Deputies and Heads of Independent Offices rather than just to the Director of Personnel, and (b) that the first sentence of paragraph 2c be amended to include "consultation with the Deputy Director (s) concerned" after "the Director of Personnel". Colonel White accepted these but asked if there were any problems with the basic substance of the paper. DD/I suggested that the Directorate is not the right level of prohibition and in subsequent discussions it was agreed to change this to Office or CS Division. DD/P questioned the problem behind the paper. Colonel White indicated the Director had been bothered and had been desirous of having some change made. Mr. Duckett suggested that the paper

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should deal with all family requirements not just married couples - this point came out somewhat mute since Mr. Stewart pressed for a separate paper, as this was negative in character, on employment of both husband and wife, and Mr. Duckett pressed for a paper which would include the married couple policy and policy on other family employment such as parent and child which would be treated in an encouraging tone. D/Personnel is to redraft (including the last sentence of paragraph 2c) for presentation to ExDir by 17 March which will allow time for Colonel White to talk to the Director. Colonel White has also in mind that the Director might wish to put this into the miscellaneous category for [REDACTED]

25X1A

f. ExComAir and Review of Air Support Activities: Colonel White asked for comments on the two papers he had passed out. I suggested a preference for a more formal group effort rather than limiting the D/PPB. Mr. Houston said that he felt the work would go faster if it is not given to the task group. He had conceded my point, however, that some technical expertise was needed and wondered if [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] might be made available to John Clark to do this job. (I agreed to check this point.) Mr. Karamessines did join me to the extent of agreeing the study paper should be put through the Deputies concerned. Colonel White agreed to accept editorial changes of this nature in the draft memorandum.

25X1A

On the [REDACTED] notice, Mr. Karamessines hoped that paragraph four would not force him to void consideration of sensitive operational requirements of the CS and he was reassured on this point. I made the two points that [REDACTED] put in his note but neither was really accepted. Colonel White seemed to misunderstand the idea of designating alternates and went more to the support of primary membership - on this point I told him that I felt it was necessary to defer to Mr. Bannerman. Mr. Houston has no problem with alternates providing it is not delegated too far down and providing that the membership is

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sufficiently divided to assure the advantages of continuity. On the proposed change in paragraph three Colonel White seemed to prefer the wording as drafted. Mr. Houston conceded that there was no definition to go with the word "major" in the first sentence of paragraph three. This discussion was concluded by ExDir in inviting editorial suggestions on the paper as well as DD/S determination on his primary representative.

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g. [REDACTED] Weekend: Colonel White at the end of the meeting mentioned a [REDACTED] weekend and informed those present that it would involve only DCI, DDCI, ExDir, the four deputies and John Clark.

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LAST MONTH							MARCH 1970							NEXT MONTH										
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Tuesday

10

March

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MEMORANDA #2 - Cunningham

B

Executive Committee Meeting Notes - 10 March 1970

1. The Director opened the meeting by reflecting to Mr. Karamessines  
the telephone call he had just completed with [REDACTED] 25X1A  
[REDACTED] Mr. Helms noted the Ambassador was full of praise for the  
Agency's [REDACTED] team. The Director noted this as significant since Mr.  
[REDACTED] was not always as favorably impressed with Agency representation.

2. DD/I advised the Defense officials had requested weekend processing of the [REDACTED] take in order to prepare SecDef for a Congressional appearance next week. Mr. Duckett noted that this [REDACTED] mission appears to be a very good one technically. The bucket is due to be picked up today or tomorrow.

3. DD/I reported, in connection with PFIAB pressure on the Agency, that [REDACTED] is setting up a seminar which will look at computer assisted analysis of substantive information concerning [REDACTED]. Apparently Government and contractor officials will be involved.


4. I noted the requirement for one of the specially cleared Agency [REDACTED] communicators to accompany [REDACTED] in order to handle any traffic in the special White House [REDACTED] privacy system.

5. The Director reacted very firmly that he would not be the first witness before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on [REDACTED]


6. Mr. Bross was back after a bout with the flu.

7. Mr. Duckett noted that today he is hosting for lunch [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] the departing and incoming ACDA military deputy.

25X1C



25X1C



9. DDCI is attending a White House meeting (I believe on some kind of a Defense review committee) this afternoon since Mr. Helms appears before the Joint Atomic Energy Committee.

10. The Director instructed Mr. Maury to invite Representative Bill Minshall (Ohio) to come out for a briefing at his earliest convenience -- breakfast or dinner or duty hours. Representative Minshall has replaced Representative Lipscomb on the House (Mahon) Agency Committee and was at yesterday's hearing.

11. Mr. Maury regaled the group with a tale of his observation of an education in the workings of the clerical/secretarial staff in the office of Congressman Mendel Rivers.

25X1A



John Jeffrey

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JAN							FEB							MAR - 1970							APR							MAY							JUNE															
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Monday

9

March

A.M.

P.M.

8:45		1:00	
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30		1:45	
9:45		2:00	
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MEMORANDA

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**SECRET**  
**EYES ONLY**

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*(B)*

MINUTES OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

A-DD/S

9 March 1970

25X1C

1. DD/I announced the schedule of NSC related sessions this week. There supposedly will be no NSC Meeting but a Review Group meets Tuesday, the Defense Committee meets Tuesday or Wednesday and the Verification Committee meets Wednesday.

2. DD/I also reported that the [REDACTED] (subject unidentified) was producing excellent material to which the Director responded that he wished the DD/I to press hard since he had recently agreed to steady liaison coverage.

25X1A

3. DD/I noted a report from Mr. Godfrey from [REDACTED] (AD/OCI told me that Mr. Godfrey is now in [REDACTED] and should be back in a day or two.)

25X1A

25X1A

4. Mr. Maury noted that Senator Stennis was quite happy with [REDACTED]. Mr. Maury also noted a long list of questions from Senator Case concerning the subject of the Gore Subcommittee Hearing. The Director reacted somewhat soberly to the content of several example questions and indicated that the position in response must be very carefully thought out.

25X1A

5. The Director also commented on the fact that [REDACTED] would continue to be picked at as a subject and that this being a fact of life no one should become unduly excited about one or another individual thrusts.

25X1A

6. [REDACTED] reported that Mr. Bross was still ill.

7. Mr. Karamessines said that there would be no 303 Committee Meeting this week and that he understood it was slipped until 20 March.

**EYES ONLY**  
**SECRET**

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GROUP 1  
downgrading and  
declassification

**SECRET**  
**EYES ONLY**

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25X1A

8. The Director noted that he was seeing Representative Mahon this afternoon - the Chairman having invited him in order to be able to counter some of the challenges raised by congressmen such as Richard McCarthy to the privileged five members of the Agency's committee. The Director decided to take [REDACTED] with him.

9. The Director noted that he had accepted an invitation to a luncheon meeting of the American Foreign Service Association on 26 (?) March. He solicited ideas for items which he might cover. ((I wonder if we might not consider suggesting Agency interest in or reaction to the various points raised in Macomber's speech and or topics being considered by the various task groups which the Macomber speech identified, since AFSA and a number of its leading lights have pressed so hard for foreign service reform.))

10. The Director and Mr. Karamessines and General Cushman engaged in a somewhat private chat about [REDACTED] and his failure to act upon an earlier Agency warning. DD/P noted that he was now holding and zeroing in on the right man.

25X1A

5X1A

11. No one mentioned during the meeting, although there had been various comments before the Director arrived, the Today Show appearance of a lawyer by the name of Beckett who asserted that [REDACTED] was claiming [REDACTED] as his boy, his son. Isn't that just unfortunate.

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A



John [REDACTED] fey

I also reported that DDS was back but brought a heavy cold + some condition which were being taken to a doctor today.

**EYES ONLY**

**SECRET**

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~~SECRET~~

25X1A

DIARY NOTESA-DD/S9 March 1970

25X1A

DD/I Car Radio: In several subsequent conversations with [REDACTED] we sorted out that Mr. Jack Smith's current car has installed two radio systems: (a) regular motor pool connection and (b) one terminal in a private DD/I net rented under a DD/I contract with Motorola. This second net which was originally installed in [REDACTED] regime consists of five vehicles, the desk of the DD/I secretary and the Watch Office. It is this second net with which Mr. Smith is unhappy and which he desires to have replaced with something which works and with something which will permit him to talk to the Operations Center to whom he can give instructions for other action.

Today Mr. Smith, in all good humor, gave me a clipping, indicating the type of thing he has in mind. I told him that we had learned more about this setup since he spoke to me on Friday and particularly that the Motorola system was one which his office contracted for. He acknowledged this but repeated that it didn't work, he wants it taken out and replaced with something which will provide him simple but effective communication with the Watch. Meanwhile, Logistics conferred by phone [REDACTED] and in person [REDACTED] discussing the same problem with [REDACTED] with a resultant agreement that [REDACTED] would test ride Mr. Smith's car and its radio systems and produce comments which will hopefully lead to a determination of what we wish to have as a replacement system. D/L is prepared to make available a customized Motorola system which is due in shortly which could put Mr. Smith's car in the security net from which calls could be phone-patched to the Watch or the DD/I offices. Action will be held until [REDACTED] hands the ball back to Support. [REDACTED] reported Mr. Smith as being currently happy with the action which is taking place.

25X1A

JWC:llc

~~SECRET~~GROUP 1  
EXCEPTING AND  
DECLASSIFICATION

Mr Coffey

~~Re item 9 -~~

~~Please take a look  
at Macomber's speech  
+ see if there are points  
we could comment on.  
+ recall, however, as  
this is State internal  
+ they are very touchy  
in this area.~~

~~14 Mar. 70~~

25X1A

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LAST MONTH							1970 MARCH 1970							NEXT MONTH						
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26	27	28	29	30	31	29	28	29	30	27	28	29	30	25	26	27	28	29	30	31

Friday

A.M.

*Saturday Duty*

6

March

P.M.

8:45		1:00	25X1A
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30		1:45	
9:45	25X1A	2:00	
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#### MEMORANDA

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LAST MONTH						MARCH							NEXT MONTH							
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Sat. - Sun.

7-8

March

P.M.

A. M.

8:45		1:00
9:00		1:15
9:15		1:30
9:30		1:45
9:45		2:00
10:00	25X1A/ [REDACTED]	2:15
10:15	[REDACTED] at	2:30
10:30	house at 345	2:45
10:45	for Mrs B -	3:00
11:00		3:15
11:15	Arrive Dulles	3:30
11:30	1440	3:45
11:45	TWA 18	4:00
12:00		4:15
12:15		4:30
12:30		4:45
12:45		5:00

## **MEMORANDA**

Approved For Release 2000/05/05 : CIA-RDP73-00027R000100040001-6

066 Sat. Mar. 7, 1970 299      067 Sun, Mar. 8, 1970 298

**SECRET**

**EYES ONLY**

(B)

MINUTES OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

A-DD/S

6 March 1970

\* 1. DD/I reported on his trip to the West Coast. He noted that economic pressures are evident and serious all over the West Coast. He also noted that young PhD's in various sciences are having difficulty finding jobs upon completion of their studies - this he got from representatives of industry and the President of [REDACTED]. He also noted the surprise at the dramatic growth of Phoenix as an electronic center stimulated principally by Motorola.

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

2. [REDACTED] reported that O/S had given an O. K. for [REDACTED] for an historian's meeting subject to his being given an appropriate defensive briefing.

3. Mr. Helms stated that the President would issue a statement on Laos at noon today, this to be followed by a backgrounder session with Mr. Kissinger with representatives of the news media. Note was made of the accuracy of the Murray Marder piece in today's Post (attached). Note was also made of the Joe Alsop article in today's Post (attached). The Director mentioned the two-hour Verification Panel Meeting yesterday and noted that there would be further meetings on March 11 and 13 and that the NSC on March 18 would deal with SALT. General Cushman bordered on the Secretary's Committee Meeting which he attended for the Director which dealt with [REDACTED] leading to the unresolved question as to where funds would come from to meet [REDACTED] desires.

25X1A

25X1A

4. [REDACTED] noted an upcoming issue of True Magazine in which an article will appear making extensive claims and allegations about actions against Haiti.

25X1A

John [REDACTED] ey



\*Extract to D/P

**EYES ONLY**  
**SECRET**

THE WASHINGTON POST -6 March 1970

# White House Statement Due on Laos

By Murrey Marder  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The White House is expected to issue a statement, probably today, on American involvement in the semi-secret war in Laos in an attempt to quell domestic alarm about escalating warfare in Southeast Asia.

There is open concern inside the administration that suspicions about clandestine warfare in Laos can shatter the relative American calm about U.S. strategy in adjoining South Vietnam. Generalized denials that there is any current administration intention to send American ground troops into Laos have failed to head off congressional apprehensions.

White House Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler said yesterday that "we have been considering this matter and there is a very good possibility that we will have some additional information to give you this weekend."

President Nixon left Washington last night by jet for a three-day weekend at Key Biscayne, Fla. He was accompanied by his principal aides, including Henry A. Kissinger, his national security adviser.

What is expected is a White House statement on Laos with a press briefing for newsmen.

The Nixon administration is expected to tell only part of the facts about the full U.S. role in the Laotian war because the conflict directly involves the Central Intelligence Agency, whose detailed activities in such a situation never are officially disclosed.

See WAR, A12, Col. 1

## WAR, From A1

President Nixon, as Presidents Johnson and Kennedy before him, is operating on the principle that any one-sided disclosure of covert activities in Laos would put the United States at a major diplomatic disadvantage and also damage the prospects for halting the Laotian conflict.

The internal argument has been that North Vietnam never admitted that it failed to comply with the 1962 Geneva agreement to pull its troops out of Laos, but instead greatly increased them. U.S. military support, training, and air power was then requested clandestinely by Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma to preserve his neutral regime.

This has put both sides, for some years, in actual violation of the Geneva neutrality accords. But whoever admitted it officially would put himself on the spot. President Nixon publicly tried to hold that line as recently as his Jan. 30 press conference. Since then, however, a rolling North Vietnamese-led offensive in Laos, reportedly with 15,000 new troops added to the 40,000 to 50,000 Hanoi soldiers there, has escalated U.S. alarm about "another Vietnam," putting pressure on the White House to speak out.

President Nixon in the recent past has acknowledged that U.S. air power has been engaged in "interdicting" the flow of North Vietnamese infiltrators across Laos into South Vietnam. The United States has said very little officially, however, about its role in the other war in Laos, for control of Laos itself.

Now, U.S. strategists themselves are wondering whether the Communists plan either to intensify the level of warfare in Laos to checkmate U.S. strategy in Vietnam, or to try to gain enough control in Laos to force the United States to halt the bombing of the so-called Ho Chi Minh infiltration trails. The latter has been a longtime Hanoi objective.

On Tuesday in a private

meeting with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State William P. Rogers sought to ease senatorial fears that the United States is contemplating sending ground troops into Laos if the situation worsens.

Administration and congressional sources yesterday both denied published reports that Rogers gave the committee a binding assurance that the Nixon administration never will do so.

It is impossible to give any such absolute guarantee, administration sources said. What Rogers did tell the committee, sources in both branches of government said, was that the administration has no current plans to send any ground combat troops into Laos and would consult with Congress in advance if such an emergency should arise.

Rogers also notified Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), chairman of a Foreign Relations subcommittee that has investigated U.S. involvement in Laos, that the "serious situation presently existing in Laos" makes it impractical for Ambassador G. McMurtie Godley to return to Washington to testify. When feasible, said Rogers, that will be arranged.

The Symington subcommittee has clashed with the administration for months over security censorship and release of the record of its closed hearings on Laos.

Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) told newsmen yesterday that he believes President Nixon is con-

sidering a report to the American people that will be "helpful" on this count, too.

Mansfield said he is encouraged to hope that more facts about U.S. activities in Laos will be released. Otherwise, he said, "The people will become more and more suspicious and the situation will become more difficult." Mansfield said, "We are up to our neck in Laos and over our head in Vietnam."

Sen. George McGovern (D-S.D.) renewed his charges yesterday that in Laos "we are flirting dangerously with a new Vietnam."

"The administration is violating the Geneva settlement of 1962 by interfering militarily in Laos," McGovern told the National Newspaper Association in the Senate auditorium. McGovern said, "I firmly believe we are at war in Laos on a dangerous scale," and "the Nixon administration is guilty of deliberate deceit" in its explanations about that war.

Sen. Harry F. Byrd (D-W.Va.) told the Senate, "Under no foreseeable circumstances must we become involved in another ground war in Asia." Byrd said a statement this week by Premier Souvanna Phouma suggests "that he may be becoming desperate and is seeking wider and more comprehensive support from the United States."

THE WASHINGTON POST - 6 March 1970

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*Joseph Alsop*

## Prevailing Double Standard On Laos Should Be Abandoned

Where is Gov. Averell Harriman, one wonders? And why has he not been speaking up about the currently dangerous problem in Laos?

With great patience and astuteness, and under instruction from President Kennedy, Gov. Harriman negotiated the Geneva Accord on Laos in 1962. At Gov. Harriman's urging, the leading neutralist and Laotian patriot Prince Souvanna Phouma, was therefore installed in the prime ministership, which he still holds. The key features of the Harriman-negotiated accord further seemed to guarantee a free run to Prince Souvanna in his own country. Both the United States and North Vietnam undertook to withdraw all their troops from Laos.

Hanoi further promised, most solemnly, to cease using Laos as a transit route for men bound for the war in South Vietnam. To make the outlook still more hopeful, the Soviet Union guaranteed that the North Vietnamese would keep these promises.

AS SOON AS the accord was signed, the United States immediately withdrew every last one of the considerable number of United States soldiers and officers who had been serving in Laos in advisory and supporting roles. Hanoi, meanwhile, had a far larger number of troops in Laos—no less than 6,000 at that time, and therefore quite enough to cause a decisive tilt in the military balance in such a tiny country. But of these 6,000 North Vietnamese troops, exactly 40 were withdrawn!

Hanoi's flagrant disregard for the accord that Gov. Harriman negotiated did not end there, either. The promise to cease using the so-called Ho Chi Minh Trail to South Vietnam was also broken before the ink on the treaty was dry. In this century's ugly history of such episodes, there has been no cruder, more open, more shameless instance of treaty violation.

Before long, the Soviet guarantees, given to Gov. Harriman and embodied in the treaty in apparent good faith, had also proved to be utterly worthless. In these circumstances, the neutral-

turn except to the United States.

Prince Souvanna therefore asked for U.S. aid, though not for a return of any Americans in uniform. Granting Prince Souvanna's request was urgently advised by Gov. Harriman's personal choice for the U.S. Embassy in Laos, the able William Sullivan, now in charge of the Vietnamese problem in the State Department.

Ambassador Sullivan's request was warmly approved by President Kennedy; and U.S. aid therefore began to be provided in the form of supplies, additional money and civilian volunteers capable of helping Laos in various ways. And as the North Vietnamese violations of Gov. Harriman's treaty continuously grew more massive, more outrageous and more dangerous to Laos, U.S. aid had to be increased.

THIS IS the long and short of the U.S. role in Laos, which is now being "exposed" by certain senators and certain reporters. You could have no better illustration of the curious double standard invariably employed by people like Sen. J. W. Fulbright.

One wonders why he and his friends are not rather more busy exposing the North Vietnamese violations of the Harriman-negotiated treaty. These violations, after all, are the sole cause of the U.S. role in Laos. But of these violations, nothing has been said by the expose-experts.

Aside from these ironies, moreover, this is now an acutely dangerous situation. In the recurrent offensives in each year's dry season in Laos, Hanoi has never before employed more than elements of two North Vietnamese regiments.

This year, in sharp contrast, major elements of two North Vietnamese divisions, the 312th and the 316th, are being used in Laos, without counting the tens of thousands of North Vietnamese troops along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in eastern Laos. The North Vietnamese are also using tanks and heavy artillery for the first time. These are the reasons they are now two months ahead of the schedules of the past, in reaching the most advanced positions they have ever occupied.

The betting is at least even that Hanoi's men will continue to use their sup-

erior power to go forward. The aim, obviously, is to reap a cheap victory in Laos, to compensate for the setbacks being caused by the Vietnamization program in South Vietnam.

But North Vietnamese occupation of most or all of Laos will be too gross and damaging an act to be treated cheaply. Thailand cannot tolerate North Vietnamese control of the other bank of the Mekong. President Nixon will also have to think about withdrawing some or all of President Johnson's enormous, quite unrequited concessions to Hanoi. So the prevailing double standard had better be abandoned with some haste.

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~~SECRET~~

25X1A

(A)



DIARY NOTES

A-DD/S

6 March 1970

Miscellaneous: Late today Colonel White telephoned on several points:

\* a. The Director has decided to keep the Chrysler but wishes to have a new engine installed. I passed this by phone to [REDACTED] who will advise when and how long it will take to acquire an engine and to make the installation.

\* \* \* \* \*

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

b. On [REDACTED], the NPIC employee, the Director wishes that no dismissal action is concluded without [REDACTED] having been seen by a psychiatrist. This was passed orally to Mr. Wattles, Mr. Osborn and Dr. Tietjen.

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

c. Colonel White wished to confirm the name of the former [REDACTED] employee who had dropped out of sight. I gave him this name and subsequently the text of a note from [REDACTED] which responded to an earlier inquiry from Colonel White as to the type of individual young [REDACTED] s.

JWC:llc

\*Extract to D/L

~~SECRET~~

CUP 1  
downgrading and  
declassification

~~SECRET~~

~~DS~~

25X1A



DIARY NOTES

A-DD/S

6 March 1970

Car Radio: Mr. Jack Smith asked me before the Morning Meeting to look into the matter of a radio for his car. He said he definitely does not want the radio which is in his current car since it has never worked. He understands that the Director has a radio-telephone setup including a telephone handset and this he believes is what he should have in his automobile. I told him I had no background as to his requirements or as to our plans but would check and let him know. I passed the problem to [redacted] after the meeting and he will check and advise.

25X1A

JWC:llc

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1  
downgrading and  
declassification

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LAST MONTH							MARCH							NEXT MONTH						
1970		FEBRUARY			1970		1970			1970		1970			APRIL			1970		
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Thursday

A.M.

5

March

P.M.

8:45		1:00
9:00		1:15
9:15		1:30
9:30	16	1:45
9:45		2:00
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12:30		4:45
12:45	25X1A	5:00

Approved For Release 2000/05/05 : CIA-RDP73-09027R001000480016  
004 Thursday, March 5, 1970

301

**SECRET  
EYES ONLY**

*[Signature]*

MINUTES OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

A-DD/S

5 March 1970

1. A/DD/I noted that Mr. Lundahl's father died this morning.
2. A/DD/I noted that the Under Secretary's Committee is scheduled to meet at 1600 to discuss special trade relations with Spain. The Verification Panel is scheduled at 1430.
3. A/DD/I reported a potential problem with DD/R&E and his planned use of compartmented photography in congressional hearings. The Director asked Mr. Duckett to call Mr. [REDACTED] to attempt to dislodge this action.

25X1A

25X1A

4. [REDACTED] reported that he had selected a number of charts used at the Director's appearance before the Gore Committee which can be given to the Committee hopefully satisfying their request for more charts.

25X1A

5. [REDACTED] advised that Mr. Jack Smith would be back tonight.

25X1A

25X1A

7. Mr. Duckett reported that the [REDACTED] launch was successful and the first day operation was very productive.

**EYES ONLY  
SECRET**

GROUP 1  
downgrading and  
declassification

**SECRET**  
**EYES ONLY**

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8. DDCI noted a satisfactory conversation that he and Mr. Gross had with newsman Orr Kelly.

9. DDCI also noted that he would be leaving Friday afternoon and would be away until Saturday on a trip to [REDACTED]

25X1A

10. The Director noted the speech by Werner Von Braun at a recent luncheon he attended in which Von Braun talked about the future essentiality of satellite photography for peaceful purposes.

25X1A

11. The Director singled out [REDACTED] for extremely high compliments for having selected and placed in his hands as he entered the White House yesterday two pages from the Congressional Record which prevented "uncomfortable confrontation" with Secretary Rogers, Under Secretary Richardson, Assistant Secretary Green, etc. This item identified Ambassador Winthrop Brown as the source of Senator Symington's information quoted in the newspapers giving imperative judgment on the significance of Laos and Vietnam. The newspaper item might have been and apparently was interpreted as indicating that the Director was the source of the information.

25X1A



**EYES ONLY**  
**SECRET**

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CPYRGHT

# U.S. Shifting Its Intelligence Strategy

By ONE KERRY

Star Staff Writer

The American intelligence community is in the midst of one of its most sweeping realignment since the one that followed the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961.

One chief aim is to save money by increasing efficiency. But another major purpose is to prepare for a markedly changed world situation that may emerge from the strategic arms limitation talks.

If the talks, scheduled to resume April 16 in Vienna, are successful, much of the intelligence now gathered in two or three weeks—in the CIA offices in Langley, Va., in place of the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency and set up a new deputy assistant secretaryship for intelligence in his office.

That office was filled in November with the appointment of Vice Adm. H. G. Bowen Jr., a Naval Academy graduate whose staff of 12 intelligence professionals may soon be expanded to 14.

A little more than a year ago, he was an insurance company executive in Boston with no more knowledge of intelligence than a casual reader of James Bond thrillers. Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird, a hoodoo friend of Bowen's, brought him to Washington as his deputy for administration.

Last April, Laird asked Chairman of the board of the Defense Resources Board, Robert E. Carline Lt. Gen. Robert E. and suggest what should be

done to strengthen support for overseas defense intelligence. Congress this year, Laird said, has been centralized, the two units acquired new chiefs as the result of retirements. The other two members are Ray Cline, a former CIA man who now heads the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and Robert F. Froehlke, assistant secretary of defense for administration.

Froehlke met whenever there

for intelligence.

Froehlke also took over as a member of the National Intelligence Resources Board in

place of the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency and set up a new deputy assistant secretaryship for intelligence in his office.

The most visible change so far in the nation's intelligence operations is the emergence of Froehlke as one of the most influential members of the intelligence community.

At the same time that con-

creation of the Defense Intelligence Agency last April after commanding M-16 units in Vietnam.

The other two members are

Ray Cline, a former CIA man

who now heads the Defense

Intelligence Agency last sum-

mer, replacing Air Force Lt.

Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, who

had headed the agency since it

was created in 1961.

And Vice Adm. Noel Gayler,

54, a Naval Academy gradu-

ate, left his post as deputy director of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff at Offutt Air Force Base, Neb., to become head of the Defense Security Agency, replacing Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, former deputy director of CIA.

In the last two years, the defense intelligence operation, which controls about 35 percent of the nation's intelligence resources, has come under sharp criticism in Congress, much of it from the House Defense Appropriations Committee, of which Laird

was formed in

1962.

Masterminding the effort to get ready for the changes is a three-man National Intelligence Resources Board. The board was set up in 1968 by Richard Helms, in his role as director of Central intelligence.

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25X1A



DIARY NOTES

A-DD/S

5 March 1970

Following the Morning Meeting I took up several points with Colonel White:

a. CIARDS Actuarial Study - I assured him that we were pressing as hard as we could but were dependent on the time table of the Government Actuary, [REDACTED] I noted Mr. Bush's hope that we will finally see this finished next week.

25X1A

b. On the letter to Admiral Harlfinger I noted again the reservations we and Mr. Bush have about inviting future business from the Navy. Colonel White said that he felt that our draft letter was too hard-nosed and had therefore modified it in redrafting. He did agree however to the suggestion that we take out the invitation for future projects. We will retype the letter accordingly.

*- done + signed  
by [initials]*

c. CT Program Paper - Colonel White asked where the CT Program Paper is. I explained that we had it ready to come to him two days ago when we learned that DD/P had raised a fundamental question concerning the internal assignment arrangement. I explained that we held it until after Mr. Cunningham had conferred with Mr. Karamessines to find out that Mr. Karamessines had (again) been misinformed by some of his staff people. I took the opportunity to ask Colonel White if he wished us to circulate the paper to the Deputies in preparation for a future Deputies' Meeting discussion. He responded that he at the moment planned to issue the paper feeling that it had been discussed over too long a period already but would hold the decision until he had had an opportunity to read the rewrite.

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~~SECRET~~

Unclassified  
or Declassification

~~SECRET~~

*W*

\* \* \* \* \*

25X1A

d. The unsuccessful status of the search for

[REDACTED] employee. (Colonel White is  
interested in learning sometime what type of  
individual she is.)

*'we got few points from FE  
which being shown to Col W.*

JWC:llc

~~SECRET~~

JAN							FEB							MAR - 1970							APR							MAY							JUNE						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S							
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LAST MONTH							1970 MARCH 1970							NEXT MONTH							1970 APRIL 1970						
1970 FEBRUARY 1970							S M T W T F S							1970 APRIL 1970							S M T W T F S						
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Wednesday

4

March

A.M.

P.M.

8:45		1:00
9:00		1:15
9:15		1:30
9:30		1:45
9:45		2:00
10:00		2:15
10:15	25X1A	2:30
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12:00		4:15
12:15		4:30
12:30		4:45
12:45		5:00

## MEMORANDA

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

B

MINUTES OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

A-DD/S

4 March 1970

25X1A

1. General Cushman was in the chair, the Director apparently being at the NSC Meeting on [REDACTED]. The meeting was very short.

25X1A

2. Mr. Proctor invited attention to the article in the Wall Street Journal on Laos. He indicated that the only new element was the assertion that the Thais had, at our request, artillery in Laos.

3. Mr. [REDACTED] reported that no Agency officer has the PSYOP clearance at present. It is possible that the five-man OCI team on duty at NMCC will again be cleared. This report is in response to an instruction from the Director.

4. Mr. Maury confirmed that the Director's appearance before the Joint Atomic Energy Committee is now scheduled for 2 p.m., March 10.

5. Mr. Maury mentioned dinner discussions with Senator Murphy at which apparently DCI, DDCI, ExDir and DDS&T will be present in addition to the Senator's staffer Dick Spears.

25X1A

6. Mr. Duckett reported that it is hoped that a successful [REDACTED] will be launched. He noted that this will have a new film load but that the capacity has been seriously reduced due to problems with a particular type of film. Mr. Proctor explained the reduced capacity by identifying that higher altitude results in lower resolution and the smaller film obviously produces fewer frames. Mr. Duckett further stated that the program is so close to completion that it is not worth attempting to correct the basic problem since an effort in that direction would probably take about as long as the remaining shots prior to [REDACTED] culmination.

25X1A



John W. Coffey

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

# The Hidden War: Analysts Doubt The Conflict in Laos Will Broaden

*Continued From Page One*

bullets (and probably some opium) for these troops, while massive U.S. air strikes, sometimes by B-52s, blast the jungle in hopes of disrupting North Vietnamese supply lines. Little of this is ever acknowledged publicly.

That's not all. American helicopters move Gen. Vang Pao between battles and press conferences. Thailand-based U.S. jets blast Hanoi's troops as they try to overrun his mountain outposts (he has lost nearly 200 in the past couple of years) and American-imported Thais, Nationalist Chinese and Filipinos perform asorted technical and military tasks in Laos.

## Guessed at the Cost

There are no official statistics worth the name about how much manpower and money the U.S. participation costs. Some guesses claim that roughly 200 U.S. airmen have been lost in Laos in recent years, and that the war effort costs Washington some \$250 million annually; the official aid figure is currently \$48 million.

However, the apparent objectives of all parties concerned still seem to be limited, despite the current furor about alleged "escalation." Consider the Communist side.

Officially, the Red troops are Pathet Lao, or Laotian Communists nominally headed by Prince Souphanouvong, a half-brother of Premier Souvanna Phouma. Actually, most of the combat forces are North Vietnamese, and Hanoi exercises tight control over all Pathet Lao actions. Of the 14,000 troops who recently captured the Plaine des Jarres (named for ancient burial urns found there), some 70% are said to be North Vietnamese; Hanoi's men comprise the fighting units while the Pathet Lao natives serve largely as coolies.

Hanoi was obviously upset by Gen. Vang Pao's unexpected seizure of the plain last fall; huge Red arms caches were uncovered, including aging Russian tanks and trucks. Thus, simple revenge was one motive for the recent counterattack. But rather sophisticated political reasons seem more important to most analysts here.

The plain is traditionally the stronghold of "neutralist" forces who form one part of the official tripartite government established in 1962. Rightists and Communists are the other factions. However, the neutral forces have split into "our" neutralists and "their" neutralists, with the Plaine des Jarres campaign having put "their" neutralists firmly in charge.

Thus, and when another peace conference is held for Laos, the new government could be composed of American-backed Premier Souvanna's men, Hanoi-dominated Communists and "Hanoi-controlled" "neutral" representatives. This would insure that a future government would be subservient to North Vietnam and would make much easier a possible total take-over by the Reds some day.

## Creating a Dilemma

Other motives also seem to guide the Communists. The Americans must "first of all, stop using the U.S. Air Force to bomb Laotian territory," demanded an official North Vietnamese foreign ministry statement last week. But many in Washington believe Hanoi isn't weeping for its Laotian allies; it really wants a bombing halt along the Ho Chi Minh trail, which funnels men and material into South Vietnam.

This theory holds that the Plaine des Jarres campaign, plus other Red pressures, is an effort to blackjack Premier Souvanna into calling

off American planes. A public appeal by him for an end of the bombing raids would create a dilemma for the Nixon Administration. It could agree, making Red resupply in South Vietnam infinitely easier, or it could reject the appeal and bomb a friendly nation whose government wants a halt.

Propaganda considerations are also important to the Communists. Hanoi has renewed war fear in the U.S. by demonstrating that its forces can go anywhere in Laos they desire despite American-backed efforts to thwart them. One goal is probably to pressure Mr. Nixon into making new concessions in search of Vietnam peace.

However, all these stop short of any Communist attempt to take over Laos. North Vietnam still pays lip service to the Geneva accords that established the tripartite government and declared it neutral. Presumably, Hanoi's leaders feel this oft-violated agreement may still prove useful some day when peace treaties are written for both Laos and South Vietnam.

## Unpredictable Americans

In addition, an element of fear probably regards the North Vietnamese advance in Laos; they just don't know what the unpredictable Americans will do next. Analysts here doubt that Hanoi expected U.S. bombing raids following the Gulf of Tonkin incident of 1964 or American troop deployments in the south a year later. A big push in Laos could trigger yet another "irrational" American response, in their view, even including bombing of Hanoi itself.

Also, the Communists may be worried about continuation of aid from Russia. The Soviet Union recognizes the Souvanna government and, with the Americans, occasionally exerts pressure to settle internal political disputes. For Moscow, this is a rather comfortable status quo that diminishes Communist Chinese influence. The Russians probably wouldn't cut off their considerable arms aid if Hanoi upset the balance in Laos, but the North Vietnamese may not be entirely sure, say analysts here.

If this leaves North Vietnamese objectives somewhat limited, the same is even more true for the Americans.

The U.S. hope is that Laos can somehow return to obscurity, serving mainly as a rugged buffer between Communist North Vietnam and China on one side and the U.S. ally of Thailand on the other. The country is largely a product of whimsical French colonial mapmakers; it has few claims to nationhood such as ethnic or linguistic unity, or a viable economy. Smuggled gold and opium are the main exports; the Laotian finance minister some time ago told a visitor things had improved because his colleagues were only stealing enough state funds to eat and not enough to get rich (if that doubtful claim was ever true, there has been a relapse since then, according to all reports).

## Military Credibility

Thus, the U.S. will continue to bankroll Prince Souvanna and his government, and Gen. Vang Pao's tribal army will continue to get American air support and arms, by all accounts. The justification is that this prevents a rout by Hanoi and gives the Laotian regime some military credibility.

But it's claimed that senior officials here ask hard questions whenever worried hawks demand "action" against the Reds in Laos. What will it accomplish and where will it lead us? the skeptical demand. Hence, the U.S. passes up or abandons moves that might have short-term payoffs but lead to long-term trouble, analysts say.

One example of a tactic abandoned: Thai artillery units financed by the Americans fought last year as Laotian troops, in clear violation of the Geneva accords. However, they have been removed. If Thai troops had been captured by the Communists, a major political uproar could have ensued. Hanoi's allies would surely display such prisoners and give maximum publicity to such an obvious infraction of the Geneva agreements—giving the U.S. a major headache.

However, some Thais still fly Royal Laotian Air Force planes, it is claimed, and others perform technical tasks. For this and other reasons, covert U.S. involvement is likely to continue. And if the Communists do make some unexpected push in Laos, a reflex reaction by the Nixon Administration could at least temporarily enlarge the American role there.

But such a move by the Administration isn't considered likely, partly because Congress has grown so aroused about Laos. Says GOP Sen. Charles Mathias of Maryland: "I was a member of Congress as we slid into Vietnam, and I didn't ask the questions then that I should have, and I can tell you that I am going to ask them now."

Such hard questioning will make it difficult for the White House to escalate in Laos even if it wants to. The Senate yesterday afternoon devoted considerable time to dire warnings about the consequences of U.S. actions in Laos. In a National Press Club speech tomorrow, Democratic Sen. Edmund Muskie of Maine is exhorting the Nixon Administration to end the conflict in Laos.

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## Analysts Doubt Conflict In Laos Will Escalate Into Another Vietnam

They Say Neither Side Plans Expansion; Debate Is Seen Aimed at Pressuring Nixon

But U.S. Involvement Is Wide

**By ROBERT KEATLEY**  
*Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL*  
WASHINGTON—When Sen. Frank Moss, D-Utah, was heading down the same tragic road of escalation . . . Once again, the American Government seems to be trying to hide from the American people the extent of our involvement there."

The speaker is Sen. Frank Moss, not normally outspoken on foreign affairs, and the subject is Laos—more a geographic whim than a nation—whose fragile neutrality has been marred by gunfire ever since the 1962 Geneva conference supposedly established peace. The Utah Democrat, a member of the Capitol Hill coalition of days, fears the Nixon Administration may sneak this country into another frustrating Asian war (much as critics charge the Johnson Administration did in Vietnam) while pretending that nothing much is really happening.

Quite a bit, in fact, is happening in Laos. But chances of Laos becoming "another Vietnam"—with U.S. ground troops slogging after an elusive enemy—seem extremely remote to most analysts here, despite considerable and continuing U.S. involvement there.

**No Big Battles**  
Analysts here worry about Laos flatly reject predictions that big battles involving Americans are coming in that odd mountainous Kingdom of the Million Elephants and the Royal White Parasol (its official title). Talks with informed sources lead to these conclusions:

—The Communists, who have just recaptured the Plaine des Jarres (usually labeled "strategic") and restored battle lines roughly to 1962 positions, have about halted their advances, although some small-scale attacks continue near. Instead of moving on, most units are resting, regrouping and trying to mend their overextended supply lines, which are being blasted by U.S. and Laotian planes.

—More important, according to U.S. analysts, Communist troops don't seem interested in pushing much further. For political and military reasons, Hanoi apparently has no plans to use its 50,000 or so soldiers in Laos to overthrow the official government or to grab additional chunks of Laotian estate, even though the ill-led troops of Laos' opium-trading, tennis-playing generals probably couldn't stop them if they tried.

—Secret American support, essential to those mountain tribesmen (the "clandestine army" of Gen. Vang Pao) who do fight the Communists effectively, will probably continue but not increase. Some Pentagon officials insist this will limit the U.S. bombing raids on Laos if only for budgetary reasons. Despite occasional pressures to "do something more" about the Reds in Laos, the White House (with much help from Defense Secretary Melvin Laird) seems determined to keep American foot soldiers out of that country.

—And some distraught Senators and Congressmen, though sincerely concerned about

COPYRGHT



the possibility of an escalating Laotian war, may have other motives for speaking out. By complaining about Laos, critics of the Vietnam war can revive public concern about Asian conflict, perhaps hoping to spur troop withdrawals from Vietnam or Laos, or to deter the Nixon team from suddenly seeking some illusory "victory" over Saigon's foes.

All this indicates that big-time war in Laos isn't likely. The Communists aren't seeking it; the Americans want to avoid it and many critics here don't really expect it. The current uproar, for most parts concerned, is largely a cynical political and propaganda exercise directed toward the Vietnam war and an eventual settlement there.

This doesn't mean there is no bloody fighting in Laos; many bedraggled Laotian troops, who would rather be back home at village fairs pursuing food and girls, are being killed daily without any clear idea what the shooting is all about. And yesterday the U.S. Embassy in Laos announced that the first American known to have died during the Plain des Jarres campaign was J. C. Maerki, a civilian helicopter pilot from Fort Worth, Texas, killed by a sniper while flying a supply mission there.

Moreover, the Nixon Administration, like the Johnson, Kennedy and Eisenhower regimes before it, is deliberately misleading about the extent of U.S. involvement in Laos. It's known that the Central Intelligence Agency finances a "secret war" of sorts there. Ex-Green Berets in mufti train and sometimes command anti-Communist Laotian forces. American planes move everything from rice to

*Please Turn to Page 15, Column 1*

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DIARY NOTESA-DD/S4 March 1970

\* 1. GSI Annual Meeting: Col. White telephoned to say that he attended the annual meeting of GSI last evening and that he had given a hard time to one and all. He mentioned particularly Mr. Dillon, the new President, and Mrs. Toomey. He asked that Mr. Bannerman be sure to see him before seeing any of the GSI officials. Mr. Bannerman should expect that he will be called for an appointment very soon after his return.

Col. White also suggested that we have the Office of Security run a name check on Mr. John H. Dillon, the new GSI President, who will have to be briefed in some detail including [redacted] contracts. Mr. Dillon is a retired Navy Department civilian employee. He was the top Navy Department civilian administrator for a number of years. He was forced out in some political hassle a number of years ago. He became a successful management consultant and has a very high reputation as an administrator and manager. [redacted] understands that Mr. Dillon agreed to take the job for 6 months only and GSI has a continuing problem of finding a long term chief executive.

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[redacted] also heard at the meeting that Marriott and Knott Hotels have turned down the chance to contract with GSA to replace GSI.) The name check request was subsequently passed to Mr. Osborn.

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2. PPB Hearing with BOB: [redacted] PPB, telephoned to advise that there will be a hearing conducted in the PPB tank by Mr. Jim Taylor, BOB, Friday, 6 March at 1300. The hearing is on an Agency request for a \$9 million reserve release for [redacted] "wondered" if we would like to have representatives at the hearing since it is so largely in the Support area. I told him that I was not at all sure since I was not aware that Support had participated in the development of the release request package. I also indicated that I was opposed to loading a hearing room particularly when a single BOB representative was involved. Finally I said that I would propose to telephone [redacted] and be

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downgrading and  
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*[Handwritten Signature]*

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responsive to his desire with respect to participation. I subsequently talked to Mr. Blake who confirmed that O/L had not contributed to this package and whose instincts are to avoid participation so that we are not placed in the position of having to pick up the justification responsibility. I discussed the subject with [REDACTED] who plans to try and handle this hearing on a very low key using the Branch Chief, [REDACTED] as the FE representative. He does not wish any Support participation - I indicated that we prefer not to load up the hearing with additional Agency [REDACTED] *Concurrence*

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concurrence to our moving on the regulatory change on returns short of tour without the necessity of meeting with him in the company of D/Pers. I assured him that we and O/P were in agreement with the wording change which had resulted from his conversation with Charlie

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[REDACTED] He asked that we put the proposed wording in the form of a recommendation on paper for his approval since it represents a change in what he had earlier approved in writing. [REDACTED] is to draft the memorandum and will get D/Pers concurrence prior to our sending it to Col. White.

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During the same telephone conversation I brought Col. White up to date on the [REDACTED] case, the lost Air Force pouch and the accident involving the new Ford which had been selected for DD/S.

4. Training Selection Board: Mr. Cunningham advised of a discussion he had had with Colonel White concerning the Training Selection Board and full-time academic training. The [REDACTED] case keyed the discussion because Colonel White reacted negatively and pushed Mr. Cunningham to justify the Board position. Mr. Cunningham informed Colonel White that the Board did not attempt to second guess the Deputies on external training requests and went on to indicate that he believed such training requests should no longer be sent to the Board. He believes that the Board should spend its only available time on matters

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*(Signature)*

such as better review of the comparative merits of candidates for competitive assignments such as to the senior schools. Mr. Cunningham is preparing a paper to present his view.

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Mr. Cunningham pointed out that he had described to Colonel White the inconsistencies of approach and treatment which are demonstrated by the [redacted] case and the DD/S&T recommendation so technically complicated that not even [redacted] representing DD/S&T on the Board, could understand it -- the [redacted] case wound up with a negative reaction whereas the incomprehensibly technical case sailed through.

JWC:llc

\*Extract to D/L

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Tuesday

3

March

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P.M.

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## MEMORANDA

**SECRET EYES ONLY**

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MINUTES OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

A-DD/S

3 March 1970

25X1A

1. This meeting was also short with considerable attention to yesterday's hearing. The Director paid particularly high compliments to Mr. Duckett and Mr. Bruce Clarke for their part in the hearing.
2. The Joint Atomic Energy Hearing for Wednesday has been cancelled. The Director suggested to [REDACTED] that it be rescheduled for 10 March.
3. A/DOCI called attention to Harry Kamm's article in today's New York Times.

4. DDCI noted an outstanding request from [REDACTED] for a meeting to talk about NIRB. After some discussion it was agreed that General Cushman and Mr. Bross would work out a script for a meeting.

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5. Before the meeting began [REDACTED] had reported that Mr. Duckett's session with the MAG last night was both good and lively.

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John [REDACTED] ey



**SECRET EYES ONLY**

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downgrading and  
declassification

LAOTIAN GENERAL  
TELLS OF U.S. LIMIT  
ON BOMBING RAIDS

Approved For Release 2000/05/05 : CIA-RDP73-00027R000100040001-6

Commander Declares Line  
Follows Road Being Built  
by China in Northwest

By HENRY KAMM

Special to The New York Times

LUANG PRABANG, Laos, March 2—Maj Gen. Tiao Savavong, commander of the northernmost military region of Laos, said today that his constant requests for American bombing in northwestern Laos were turned down because of the existence of a line beyond which the United States did not bomb in Laos.

The line, according to the general, follows a road being constructed by Communist China from the northwestern border of Laos in the direction of the Laotian-Thai border. United States bombing, according to the general and his deputy for operations, Col. Bounchanh Savathphayphone, halts at a strip three miles from the eastern edge of the road.

Details on obituary page. There has been an upsurge of concern in the United States over reports of stepped-up bombing in Laos by American planes, including B-52's. Despite American air support, Laotian government troops have been driven off the strategic Plaine des Jarres by North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces.

**U.S. Aides Won't Comment**  
Customarily, United States and Laotian officials reply to questions on American bombing with a formula to the effect that the United States conducts armed aerial reconnaissance with the right to return fire if fired upon.

United States officials declined to comment on the general's implicit avowal of American bombing.

General Savavong, a half brother of King Savang Vatthana, made his remarks in an interview at his headquarters, across the road from Luang Prabang airport, a single strip that serves commercial airliners. Royal Laotian Air Force converted single-engine trainer planes carrying bombs and rockets under the wings; light, unarmed American planes on undisclosed missions; Laotian Army helicopters and gunships, and cargo planes bringing American air supplies.

The Chinese road from Botene on the Laotian border has reached a point 40 miles northwest of Luang Prabang, south of the town of Muong Houn, and is continuing in the direction of Thailand. It follows the course of the Beng River.

**Road to Dienbienphu,**  
Another Chinese-built road connects Muong Sai with Dienbienphu, just across the border in North Vietnam.

The Chinese are constructing the roads under a tentative plan discussed in the early sixties with the Government of Premier Phoumi Nosavan. Laotian sources contend that while there may be some justification for the projects in northernmost Phongsaly Province and the stretch to Dienbienphu, no

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## Laotian General Tells of U.S. Limit on Bombing Raids

Continued From Page 1, Col. 5


plan for a road toward Thailand was ever discussed.

Colonel Bounchand said the Chinese were using 2,000 soldiers along the road toward Thailand. He said there was an infantry battalion near the starting point, two engineer battalions carrying out the work with the help of Laotian coolies and one antiaircraft battalion deployed along the road. Informed sources said the Chinese antiaircraft batteries had never gone into action, presumably because of the limits on American bombing.

American sources put the number of Chinese troops throughout northern Laos at 6,000. They are reported to be under steady surveillance by Laotian intelligence agents. Asian diplomatic sources in Washington have put the number of Chinese troops in the area at 20,000.

There was no tension around General Sayavong's second military region headquarters although about midnight Saturday a small Pathet Lao unit got within about a mile of the northern end of the airstrip and lobbed 20 mortar rounds in the direction of the airstrip. All the shells fell in nearby fields doing no damage.

The attack made no imprint on the mood of Luang Prabang, which is sleepy even beyond normal Laotian tranquillity. The sense of security is rooted in a belief that the Communists would never attack the royal capital. The optimism is not considered naive. The Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese have never challenged the King's authority, and well-informed Laotians believe that as long as they seek to maintain an appearance of legitimacy



The New York Times

March 3, 1970.

A corner of Laos bordered by a road the Chinese have been building from Botene (1) to Muong Houn (2) and beyond toward the Thai border is said to be out of bounds for American bombers. This restriction apparently does not apply to the Plaine des Jarres and other areas held by the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao (diagonally shaded).

this town of 30,000 will continue to be spared.

Some people are aware that Muong Soui last week puts

them only 30 miles from the road that links Luang Prabang and principal city of Vientiane. But they have been through it all before and refuse to worry. Children bathe, women wash clothes and men fish in the Mekong, which is too low for the riceboats from Vientiane at this season. Monks, a large share of the population, promenade under their yellow parabolongs. A pity, he said, because

sols from pagoda to pagoda. The number and beauty of the temples is the pride and fame of Luang Prabang.

Bounkhom Pradichit, prefect, or mayor, of the city, said there was plenty to eat and that Communist ambushes along the road from Vientiane had not curtailed food. But he said there was a sharp reduction of general goods traffic to Luang Prabang. The principal casualty, he said, was the cement for the tennis court at the Cercle Privé, a private sports club to which he be-

had succeeded in sidestepping the Ministry of Sports and Youth and persuading the Finance Ministry to underwrite the cost of building the court.

But the United States had come to his aid, the prefect said. He said the Agency for International Development had rescued the Cercle Privé by lending it five tons of cement.

Senator Fulbright, Arkansas Democrat, announced that he intended to invite Mr. Rogers and Mr. Laird to testify on Laos. Although no date has yet been set, committee sources indicated the hearings may come in the next few days.

The Administration was understood to acknowledge the danger that the North Vietnamese thrust across the Plaine des Jarres last month may be followed by further attacks aimed at both military and political targets.

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*(Signature)*



DIARY NOTES

A-DD/S

3 March 1970

1. Risk-of-Capture: Mr. Stewart telephoned reference the Risk-of-Capture training paper which we had sent out to the officers who attend the Deputies' Meetings. He proposed, having already received Colonel White's endorsement that instead of having the subject discussed at a Deputies' Meeting as proposed in our paper, we have a test running of the course itself with participation by a representative of each of the Deputies' Meeting principals. [REDACTED] has discussed this with OMS/PSS and OTR and we propose to go ahead with a proper Risk-of-Capture one-day course with a full student complement which will have room for the representatives of the Deputies' Meeting principals. It was estimated that preparation for this course running would require approximately three weeks' time. We will shortly be informed of the date selected and can then inform ExDir, the Deputies, the IG and GC of this change in direction.

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2. Luncheon Meeting with State Department Representatives: As arranged, Mr. Bush and I met and lunched with Mr. Frank Meyer, Mr. Joseph F. Donelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Budget and Finance, Mr. Ernest Warlow, Director, Foreign Buildings Operations and Mr. William Meek, Funds Management Director. The prime purpose was to discuss and reach agreement on the handling of the [REDACTED]

An

[REDACTED] An acceptable understanding was reached which is to be translated into a Memorandum for the Record (to be drafted by Mr. Bush) which will be agreed with Mr. Meyer and placed in the record of both organizations.

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GROUP 1
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DIARY NOTES

A-DD/S

3 March 1970

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I informed Col. White orally of the initial information concerning [REDACTED] NPIC cartographer, whose difficulties had been reported to us yesterday afternoon by [REDACTED] and today by Mr. Osborn. I confirmed to Mr. Proctor that Col. White had been informed.

*Subsequently - end of day -  
JWC:llc gave full info to S & W.*

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GROUP 1  
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A.M.

**Monday**

2

March

P.M.

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## **MEMORANDA**

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~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

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(b)

MINUTES OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

25X1A

A-DD/S

2 March 1970



1. This was a very short meeting since the Director and several others had to leave early for the Gore Committee Hearing. The meeting was devoted almost completely to items relating to or relatable to the hearings, e.g., checking the accuracy of various news reports for future articles that had appeared over the weekend or in Monday's papers.

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25X1A

2. Mr. Karamessines reported that [REDACTED] was on leave in [REDACTED] for a few days.

3. General Cushman reported the good visit to [REDACTED] and mentioned to Mr. Karamessines that [REDACTED] had done well by him.

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25X1A

25X1A



John [REDACTED] offey

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

# Newsmen See Long Chen Base Click

CPYRGHT

By Jack Anderson

The inside story can now be told of what has been going on at the secret Long Chen base, which three unauthorized newsmen visited in Laos last week.

The newsmen slipped away from a conducted tour and hitchhiked to the forbidden base, carefully skirting government roadblocks. For two hours, they watched American-made planes taking off at the rate of one a minute. They also reported seeing armed Americans in civilian clothes on the base.

The Long Chen base has been used to support the government guerrillas whom the United States has trained and supplied. The bulk of them are Mee tribesmen, who have been deadly effective at harassing the North Vietnamese invaders.

In a previous report, this column told how President Johnson, after halting the bombing of ~~Approved For~~ merely transferred the bombing campaign across the border and unleashed the same

bombers against North Vietnamese targets in Laos.

The bombing was so devastating that U.S. advisers decided their guerrillas might be able to throw the North Vietnamese off the strategic Plain of Jars. A government force of 10,000 guerrillas, commanded by Maj. Gen. Vang Pao, swept over the plain last year.

The whole operation was planned and supported by the United States. American fighter bombers and gunships chewed up the retreating North Vietnamese. American helicopters and transport planes hauled in the government guerrillas.

Once the guerrillas had captured the Plain of Jars airfield, which was given the American code name of "Lima Lima," an airlift was established between Long Chen and the captured field.

The U.S. advisers never thought their rugged, little guerrillas could hold the plain against the superior North Vietnamese. ~~Approved For~~ operation was intended as a massive, hit-and-run attack.

Its success was spectacular.

The guerrillas struck the North Vietnamese a bloody blow and captured huge quantities of supplies.

## Civil Rights at OEO

For the first year of the Republican takeover, a career bureaucrat named Walter Robbins served as acting director of the antipoverty program's Civil Rights Division. He was finally forced out last month by blacks who felt a Negro should be in charge of civil rights.

Not the least bitter over being ousted by the blacks he had been defending, Robbins turned the other cheek. He left his successor, an able Negro named Frank Kent, a thoughtful memo declaring:

"Segregation exists on a wide scale within our programs in spite of the agency's Herculean efforts to eliminate it. Patterns of segregation imposed on the poor by the power structure are so well ingrained that the Office of Economic Opportunity funded programs cannot help but reinforce it."

Robbins pointed out that federal assistance is going pri-

marily not to poor blacks but to affluent whites.

"The real beneficiaries of federal domestic assistance," he declared fiercely, "are the middle class, particularly the residents of the affluent suburbs that ring our decaying inner cities."

"Low-income Americans provide a disproportionately high share of tax revenue when measured against their incomes. Yet they receive the short end of the stick every possible way when it comes to the distribution and expenditure of tax dollars at the local level."

"This discrimination against low-income, inner-city and rural residents is compounded by the racial discrimination which ghettoizes groups of people on the basis of their race."

"Why should a city or county be permitted to use open space and recreation money granted by the federal government in a way which benefits the middle class to the virtual exclusion of the ill-housed, ill-fed, unemployed residents? . . ."

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# 'Scorched Earth' Reported in Laos

## U.S. Aided Plan

By Jack Foisie  
*Los Angeles Times*

VIENTIANE — The Royal Lao government, with the assistance of Americans, apparently conducted a scorched-earth policy last fall in anticipation of the Communist drive to recapture the Plain of Jars in northern Laos.

The aim was to leave the Communist enemy nothing upon which he could live—no people, no shelter, and no stocks of food or buffalo.

As the Communist forces began their advance towards the Plain of Jars three weeks ago, U.S. aircraft evacuated some 13,000 refugees to the Vientiane area from villages on the plateau.

Many of these people went voluntarily, happy to be out of the way of allied bombing strikes, and away from the armies of both sides, which periodically move across the plain.

But it was also learned today that another, forcible evacuation had been conducted by the allies in September and October to remove all of the merchant class in the towns and villages of the Plain of Jars.

They were removed because of the fear that they had been, and would again be, the principal supporters of the Pathet Lao. It was assumed that many did not want to submit to Communist control, but felt it was the best way to save at least part of their wealth—by staying in place and putting up with the heavy taxes that Pathet Lao extracted from them.

See LAOS, A6, Col. 2

CPYRGHT

THE WASHINGTON POST  
A6 Monday, March 2, 1970

## Laos 'Scorched' Plain of Jars

### Air Losses In Laos Disclosed

#### SUMMARY, From A1

The overall U.S. plane losses may now be closer to 400 than 300.

The U.S. Command's annual summary also notes without further comment that the number of Americans missing in action at the end of the year was 118 greater than 12 months previously.

Since almost all the U.S. missing are airmen and almost all of these are missing in Laos, the annual report indicates about 100 missing in the past year—by far the largest figure of any year since the war in Vietnam began spilling over into Laos.

The U.S. embassy in Vientiane has furnished the Communist Pathet Lao representative in Vientiane with the names of 184 American airmen missing in action in Laos. Some of these names date back to 1964.

So far the Communist Pathet Lao have given no information concerning any of the downed fliers, although Pathet Lao prisoner of war camp known to exist.

Information Ban

#### LAOS, From A1

There was sufficient documentation of forcible taxation of these merchants and artisans to make evacuation advisable under the policy of removing helpers away from the Pathet Lao.

#### Rough Handling Alleged

However, what is emerging now is evidence of the rough handling of some of these persons by the troops of Gen. Vang Pao, the Royal Army commander in the area.

The forced evacuation included the removal of 680 Chinese, 60 Vietnamese who were long-time residents of Laos, 60 Thais also living for some time in the area, 85 Cambodians and seven Indians.

They had to walk to air strips as far as 20 miles from their villages and were allowed to take with them only what they could carry.

Although no Americans are known to have been on the ground at the time these villages were evacuated, Americans helped plan the program and U.S. pilots and planes flew them out of the plain.

Allowing for some harsh

feeling on the part of the evacuees, and the possibility that some may have Communist loyalties, a careful interrogator

of a number of refugees leaves the impression that the September-October evacuations were roughly handled.

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and there are many similar reports:

He lived in the village of Khang Khay on the northern side of the plain. He does not wish to give his name or nationality.

Last Sept. 13, troops of Vang Pao's army came in and ordered all the villagers to prepare to leave in an hour. Then, this man claims, the troops began burning houses, helping themselves to people's possessions, and molesting women.

He says the soldiers shot all the livestock.

"The soldiers were brusque and rude, and made no distinction between Lao, Chinese or other national groups," he said.

The refugees were required to walk about 20 miles to an airstrip, where they waited for planes.

At the airstrip, the Lao refugees were ordered to stay behind and he does not know what happened to them. But it is no secret that Vang Pao's army badly needs fighting men of almost any age, and it is the practice to induct Lao or mountain tribesmen who are refugees into uniform. Their families are allowed to stay with them.

#### Flown to Vientiane

The other nationals were flown to Vientiane. The pilots were American.

In Vientiane, their experiences were mostly accommodated by the Chinese community. Indi-

ans were likewise cared for by Indian residents. For the others, it was up to their respective embassies.

I saw ten Vietnamese families—about 40 persons—living together in the moderately comfortable two-room house that had been rented for them for six months by the South Vietnamese embassy.

They were rather well off—but will be forced out when the rental period ends. The embassy says it will continue to provide them with rice, but can do nothing more.

Some church groups and the U.S. aid mission have given help.

Lao officials have given them identity cards.

Their main complaint is the inability to find work. Another complaint is that the government has not offered to buy their Pathet Lao-issued currency, which is almost worthless in Vientiane.

#### Souvanna Requests Geneva-Type Meeting

VIENTIANE, March 1—Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma sent letters today to the British and Soviet embassies officially requesting Geneva-style consultations on the situation in Laos, embassy sources said.

Britain and the Soviet Union were co-chairman of the 1962 Geneva Conference, which guaranteed the neutrality of Laos.

Souvanna announced four

days ago that he intended to write to the co-chairmen calling for consultations.

The only military action reported in Laos today was a bombardment of 15 88-mm. mortar shells near the airfield of the royal capital of Luang Prabang, 142 miles north of the administrative capital of Vientiane. No damage or casualties were reported and the mortar shells exploded in an open ricefield.

#### Sen. Mathias Wary Of Laos Involvement

WASHINGTON, March 1, (UPI) — Sen. Charles McC. Mathias (R-Md.) said today he fears the United States may be inching into a commitment in Laos similar to that in Vietnam.

"I think we're reaching the point now that we might be close to the commitment that we inched into in Vietnam where if something goes wrong we find ourselves committed far beyond the intention of the Congress or beyond the intention of the American people," Mathias said.

Asked about the apparent buildup of military activity in Laos, including reports of an increasing American military presence there, Mathias said, "I think you have to view it very seriously."

Mathias was interviewed on the CBS television program "Face the Nation."

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AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

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MONDAY, MARCH 2, 1970

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## Laos: The Same Old Shell Game

Even the best dispatches from Laos read like some combination of Terry and the Pirates, Graham Greene and Art Buchwald. Our Man of the Hour is General Vang Pao who is rated by American officials just behind Alexander the Great, in large part because by Asian military standards he is honest, which is to say that when we pay him the money for his men, the men get paid. But his men are mostly teenaged kids recruited from the tough Meo hill tribes and built into an irregular army, financed, trained, supported, and largely directed by the Americans (which is another way of saying the CIA). This supposedly secret operation is a secret to nobody in Laos. It was conceived as a substitute for the regular armed forces of the Laotian Government which is supposed to be neutral, and whose army doesn't fight much, and as a counterweight to Communist forces, both imported and homegrown. Van Pao's army does fight, but lately it has been doing badly in what pass for battles in the Laotian war but are really rather eccentric skirmishes for places like the Plain of Jars or Lima Lima or Muong Suoi. These are called *strongholds* or *key towns* or *vital road junctions* until they change hands, which they do more or less regularly, at which time they turn out to be more like tennis trophies, temporarily held, until the next tournament.

All this is played out against the backdrop of a psychedelic political power struggle between fractured Centrists and splintered Neutralists, Rightists and crypto-Communists, which might tell you a great deal about the significance of the military byplay if you could somehow wrap your mind around it, and having done that, take it seriously.

That's the thing about Laos—it is hard to take it seriously until suddenly something or somebody threatens to upset the delicate equilibrium and the whole thing ceases to be a giant put-on and becomes, or is made to become, a critical element in the Vietnam equation or a test of strength and will between us and the Russians, or perhaps us and Hanoi. This is what is happening now, as it happened in 1961 and in 1964 and again last year, and it happens, of course, because we are in Vietnam and because Laos is next door. Wedged in between Red China, Burma, Thailand, and stretching alongside the two Vietnams, it is *strategic*, as an infiltration from North Vietnam to the South, and as an opening Southward for the Communist Chinese. It is also a *domino*, if you accept that image, ready to fall if Vietnam isn't held upright—although as of now you could argue that it might fall even if South Vietnam is held up, which could reverse the theory, and make South Vietnam the next to go. In any case, we care about Laos for the same reason we care about Vietnam, and that is at least understandable.

What is neither understandable nor defensible, in our view, is the way we give expression to our care—furtively, in clandestine support of a proxy army, and without the slightest concern for Congressional prerogatives or for the possible consequences of systematically deceiving the American public about an expanding American military intervention which could all too easily fail.

You might have thought that, having seen the results of the great Vietnam shell game as conducted by the last Administration, the present one might have learned something about the effect this can have on public understanding and support. But no, President Nixon has decreed that he doesn't think "the public interest would be served by any further discussion" of Laos and that apparently is that. The President will go to Congress if there is any change contemplated in our military involvement in Laos, Secretary Laird has promised, and this would be somewhat reassuring were it not for the fact that our military involvement *has* changed, significantly, and the President *hasn't* gone to Congress about it, at least publicly.

It is all too familiar, including the rationale. We are bound by the 1962 Geneva accords which set

up a neutral Laotian government, the Administration argues privately, and since these accords called for the removal of all outside military forces we cannot discuss what we are now doing in Laos without acknowledging publicly and officially that we are violating the accords. The theory is that this would then make it incumbent on the Russians to do something in response, as a matter of pride or prestige or simple geopolitics—and never mind that the Communists broke the Geneva agreement from the day that it was signed. Even assuming that there is something to this theory, at best it would only justify a policy of silence; it can not justify the sort of calculated dissembling engaged in by Secretary Laird when he was asked the other day on Meet the Press whether American B-52's were used to provide close-in support of Laotian troops in the Plain of Jars. "This is quite far from the Ho Chi Minh trail which the President said we were bombing to interdict supplies into South Vietnam," the questioner continued, "Does this mean we have decided to take a role in the Laotian war?" This is the nub of it, of course—whether we are bombing in Southern Laos as part of the Vietnam interdiction effort, or intervening increasingly in the quite separate Laotian civil war in the North, and Mr. Laird's answer deserves to be set down in full:

*First, I would like to say it is not possible to use B-52's for close-in support. Any close-in support would have to be provided by tactical air and of course the Royal Laotian forces have tactical air of their own. The President has said that we are using United States air power as far as the interdiction of supplies and material coming into Vietnam are concerned. The mission of air power, as far as Laos is concerned, on the Ho Chi Minh trail, has been handled by the President of the United States and we have used it in connection with the war in Vietnam. We have of course flown reconnaissance missions over Laos on a continuing basis. These reconnaissance missions have been accomplished by armed escort. The President has made it clear the mission of our air power as far as the war in Vietnam, and that is all that I care to say on it at this time.*

While it would be too much to characterize this as a pack of lies, it is at least a pack of evasions, irrelevancies, semantics and half-truths. B-52's have regularly been used in Vietnam for what could reasonably be called "close-in" support—as witness their vaunted effectiveness at Khe Sanh. More important, there is compelling evidence that they were used in the recent unsuccessful defense of the Plain of Jars, and this marked a significant step-up in our combat role in Laos. Leaving all that aside, it is nonsense to talk about reconnaissance flights with armed escorts when everybody in Laos who cares knows that we are flying about as many pure-and-simple bombing missions in support of our proxy army in the North as we are flying interdiction missions in the South.

The simple fact is that we are deeply involved in the Northern war, such as it is, no matter what arm of the government pays for it, or provides the military advisers—or what if any uniform they wear. And while it is easy to laugh about that war, because it never seems to get anywhere, it is just as easy to make the case that our forces dangerously disturbed a five-year equilibrium by reoccupying the Plain of Jars last fall, and thus inviting its recapture in the last few weeks.

Perhaps it will stop at that. Or perhaps Hanoi has hit upon Laos as a new way of squeezing us in Vietnam, by raising new anxieties and fresh outrages in this country over our whole inter-locking Asian policy. In any case, with at least two months of dry season ahead, none of the experts in this town are prepared to say categorically that the Communist forces will not now press on in Northern Laos towards the Mekong or the administrative capital of Luang Prabang, or to predict what kind of crisis this would provoke, militarily out there, or politically here at home. And that in itself is argument enough to keep the same old shell game.

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